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ARTICLES
The Contribution of Social Movement 
Theory to Understanding Genocide
Evidence from Rwanda
Aliza Luft
Abstract: Recent years have witnessed a turn in the field of con-
tentious politics toward the study of political violence, yet scholars 
have yet to focus their lens on genocide. Moreover, research on 
genocide is characterized by fundamental disagreements about its 
definition, origins, and dynamics, leading to a lack of generalizable 
theory. As a remedy, this article suggests that research on genocide 
can be improved by incorporating concepts from social movements. 
After reviewing the history of research on social movements and 
genocide, I analyze civilian participation in the Rwandan genocide 
as an example of how social movement theory helps explain civil-
ian mobilization for genocide. Finally, I propose that a contentious 
politics approach to genocide would consider it one among many 
forms of contentious collective action, analyzable within the exist-
ing framework of social movement theory.
Keywords: contentious politics, framing, genocide, organizations, 
political opportunities, political process theory, Rwanda, social 
movement theory
Slightly over a decade ago, Colin Beck proposed that social movement 
theory had much to contribute to the study of terrorism. In his article, 
Beck argued for the analysis of terrorism as “a form of contentious 
politics, analyzable within the basic social movement approach of mobi-
lizing resources, political opportunity structure, and framing” (2008: 
1565). Beck identified cultural perspectives of social movement theory 
that address issues of identity in terrorist groups, the importance of 
studying networks (including recruitment and retention), research on 
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radicalization and its relationship to repression and movement cycles, 
and the relevance of work on transnational social movements for under-
standing international terrorism.
Following Beck, in 2015, I made a similar argument, suggesting 
that social movement theory has much to contribute to understanding 
genocide (Luft 2015a). In particular, I argued that the same mobiliza-
tion mechanisms found in other forms of contentious politics are often 
found in genocides, including framing and diffusion processes, while 
networks, I argued, can help pull people both toward participation in 
violence as well as away from it (see also Luft 2015b).
Picking up where my previous argument left off, this article combines 
primary fieldwork with secondary oral testimonies from participants in 
the Rwandan genocide as well as Human Rights Watch organization 
reports from the decade prior to, and during, the genocide to dem-
onstrate how a social movement approach to genocide elucidates the 
processes by which previously nonviolent citizens mobilize to kill their 
neighbors. Specifically, the evidence demonstrates the importance of 
organizations and resource mobilization, framing, and political oppor-
tunity structures for mobilizing Rwandan civilians to participate in 
violence against their neighbors. In turn, the findings suggest that a 
contentious politics approach to genocide can help explain how previ-
ously nonviolent citizens mobilize to kill their neighbors.
To be sure, scholarship on violent political mobilization in social 
movements has recently proliferated. Often, this research focuses on 
variation in micro-mobilization for armed conflict (e.g., Bosi 2012; Bosi 
and Della Porta 2012; Viterna 2006, 2013) as well as on distinct forms of 
violent protest such as white supremacist movements (McVeigh 1999, 
2009), religious militantism (Appleby 2000), and other violent left- and 
right-wing social movements (e.g., Dobratz and Waldner 2012; Klander-
mans and Mayer 2006; Klimke 2010). Yet prior to this new wave of 
scholarship, research on political violence “remained largely outside 
the realm of social movements research” (Steinhoff and Zwerman 2008: 
214). Moreover, in 2008, Donatella Della Porta wrote that such work 
remained “episodic” in the social sciences (2008: 221). As a result, the 
years since have seen a surge of research on political violence and social 
movements (in addition to the above, see Bosi and Giugni 2012; Maney 
et al. 2012; and Oberschall 2004). Despite these developments, social 
movement research has said very little about genocide,1 even though 
the field itself was originally developed in reaction to fascism (Nazism 
in particular), a political movement responsible for arguably the worst 
genocide of the twentieth century (Luft 2015a; Meyer 2004).
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That said, genocide and social movements are not the same. Geno-
cide is typically organized by the state against civilians, while social 
movements often refer to challenges from below. However, distinctions 
between top-down and bottom-up mobilization processes ought not to 
preclude research that questions what similarities and differences exist 
between these two kinds of mobilization. Moreover, though some might 
argue that social movement theory does not apply to top-down pro-
cesses and only to mobilization initiated by civilians, in keeping with the 
literature on collective behavior and social movements more generally, I 
suggest there is nothing inherent to popular movements that precludes 
scholars from studying their dynamics when initiated by the state. 
Hence, Yang Su (2013) in The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and 
Political Movements defines “a state-sponsored social movement” as that 
which occurs when “collective action events are peopled by citizens in 
their capacity as nonstate actors, but the main source of claims, leader-
ship, and organizational resources is from within the state itself, and 
state actors, in their official capacities, serve as the main organizers.” 
He lists genocide as an example. Although I do not here consider it as 
a social movement per se, I do assert that theories of social movements 
can be useful for the study of genocide, as they have been useful for the 
study of other forms of violent politics, which I noted above.
Additionally, as Pamela Oliver and colleagues (2003) explain, the 
start of the twenty-first century was marked by protests and forms of 
activism that have not always been linked to pro-democratic tenden-
cies. Recent research and current events have also demonstrated that 
antidemocratic movements are a recurrent feature of modern political 
life (e.g., Cunningham 2012; Fetner 2008; Hardisty 2000; Klandermans 
and Mayer 2006; McAdam and Kloos 2004; McVeigh and Estep 2019; 
for a useful review, see Blee 2018 and Blee and Creasap 2010). Thus, 
Oliver and colleagues argue: “It seems to us that one test of any theory 
of social movements is that we be able to use the same theory to explain 
processes in movements we celebrate and those we abhor, or at least 
to provide a genuinely theoretical account of how they differ” (2003: 
236). This article presents one such attempt by applying social move-
ment theory to the case of the Rwandan genocide and demonstrating 
how, indeed, the mechanisms often identified as significant for motivat-
ing progressive contentious politics can and do explain much of what 
occurs in normatively regressive and violent forms of collective action.
Finally, the incorporation of scholarship on political violence into 
the field of social movements—be it top-down or bottom-up—is cen-
tral to Doug McAdam and colleagues’ (1996, 2001), Sidney Tarrow’s 
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(1989, 2011) and Charles Tilly’s (2003, 2005) and Tilly and Tarrow’s 
(2006) contentious politics paradigm of research. Goodwin adds:
Political violence, like nonviolent resistance, civil wars, riots, and 
revolutions, is one form among others that contention may take. . . . 
The study of political violence should not become an academic spe-
cialty or subdiscipline, but should be folded in to the broader field of 
contentious politics. (2012: 3)
Continuing on Goodwin’s line of work, one might then classify genocide 
as a form of categorical political violence against civilians. According 
to Goodwin (2006: 2031), categorical terrorism occurs when terrorist 
groups target “anonymous individuals by virtue of their belonging (or 
seeming to belong) to a specific ethnic or religious group, nationality, 
social class, or some other collectivity” with the intention of influenc-
ing several audiences. Genocide, then, can be thought of as political 
violence organized by the state that targets nonstate actors because of 
their perceived or actual affiliation with a particular collectivity, regard-
less of whether they are involved in contention. The collective bases for 
categorical political violence include, but are not limited to, race, ethnic-
ity, nationality, religion, and social class.
After briefly reviewing the history of research on social movements 
and genocide, including where they have converged and diverged in 
the past, this article examines 21 interviews with Rwandan genocide 
perpetrators collected by Scott Straus—which are published in the book 
Intimate Enemy: Images and Voices of the Rwandan Genocide (Lyons 
and Straus 2006)—and 9 Human Rights Watch reports in order to dem-
onstrate similarities between research on participation in social move-
ments and how individuals explain their participation in the Rwandan 
genocide. Given constraints of space and the wide array of research on 
social movements, this article focuses mostly on the dominant politi-
cal process paradigm, which emphasizes the role of organizations and 
resource mobilization, framing, and political opportunity structures in 
mobilizing civilians with no preexisting history of violence to kill their 
neighbors. With data from local-level participants in the Rwandan geno-
cide, I demonstrate how empirically observable phenomena found in 
social movements can also be found in mobilization processes for geno-
cide. Further, I propose that theories of the mechanisms that mobilize 
individuals for contentious politics—which have long been the purview 
of social movement research—have much to offer for explanations of 
civilian participation in genocide. Subsequently, this article asserts that 
a social movement approach to genocide would consider it one form 
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of contentious politics among others, analyzable within the existing 
frameworks of social movement theory.
The History of Social Movement Theory and the History of 
Research on Genocide
When most people think of social movements, they think of leftist poli-
tics and political mobilization for progressive causes—for example, the 
Civil Rights movement, the Feminist movement(s), and antiwar pro-
tests.2 Yet the field of social movements was originally developed in 
reaction to right-wing fascist movements and to Nazism in particular 
(Meyer 2004). Initial research characterized social movements as fun-
damentally irrational and brought on by dysfunction in society, and 
it argued that those who engaged in collective action did so because 
of anomie, deprivation, and/or contagion. What was thought of as a 
“spontaneous outburst” of social action was considered harmful, dan-
gerous to society, and something only radical and irrational individu-
als would engage in. Such premises underpinned much research on 
collective behavior in the 1950s and 1960s (Blumer 1951; Kornhauser 
1959; Smelser 1962; Turner and Killian 1957). “The assumption,” Meyer 
explains, “was that social movements represented alternatives to . . . 
politics” (2004: 126–127). They were thus described as inherently un-
desirable and even dangerous to a healthy society.
Likewise, initial research on why civilians participate in genocide 
followed two streams: the first emphasized dysfunctional or otherwise 
problematic societies while the second emphasized individuals with 
psychopathologies or faulty socialization. Among arguments focused on 
the structural level, Hannah Arendt (1958) maintained that genocide is 
the product of totalitarianism, its external expansion, and its internal 
consolidation. Irving Horowitz wrote that genocide is the “operational 
handmaiden” of totalitarianism (1976: 36). Leo Kuper (1981) theorized 
that the institutionalization of power for one group in a plural society 
while others remain disenfranchised explains genocide, and Rudolph 
Rummel claimed that more authoritarianism at the state level meant a 
greater likelihood of genocide since, as the famous dictum goes: “Power 
kills; absolute power kills absolutely” (1994: 1).
Among explanations at the individual level, participants in geno-
cide were defined as having “authoritarian personalities” character-
ized by an exploitative power orientation, moralistic condemnation 
of others, diffuse and depersonalized aggression, and a preoccupation 
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with toughness, to name just a few (Adorno et al. 1950). Others who 
argued that perpetrators had aberrant personalities include Gay Block 
and Malka Drucker (1992), Eva Fogelman (1994), Monroe et al. (1990), 
Samuel Oliner and Pearl Oliner (1998), and Nechama Tec (2003). Ronald 
Aronson perhaps best echoes the similarities between initial research on 
social movements and research on genocide in describing genocide as 
the product of “social madness” (1987: 136).
Since these initial forays into how and why people participate in 
social movements and genocide, research in both fields has turned to 
the relationship between mobilization and democracy. Again, as David 
Meyer (2004) explains, protest movements of the 1960s thrived in 
advanced industrial societies, a fact that forced scholars to question 
their assumptions about the relationship between social and individual 
dysfunction and mass mobilization. Not only were activists in both 
the United States and the United Kingdom found to be psychologically 
well-adjusted (Keniston 1968) and more civically engaged than their 
nonactive counterparts (Parkin 1968), researchers argued that because 
activism occasionally led to progressive government concessions, pro-
test could be seen as a rational decision made by individuals who were 
otherwise disenfranchised and unable to make claims using conven-
tional methods (Piven and Cloward 1977). Protest came to be seen as 
a “political resource” necessary for democratic politics (McCarthy and 
Zald 1977), rather than irrational behavior resulting from widespread 
anomie and individual deviance.
Genocide, too, has come to be seen as an activity of “ordinary 
people” that may occur even in democratic societies. Perhaps most 
famously articulated by Arendt (1976), Zygmunt Bauman (1989), and 
Christopher Browning (1998), the central argument is that an individual 
need not be sadistic or have a particularly authoritarian personality type 
but, rather, various social norms and group pressures that exist in times 
of normalcy can motivate individuals to join in mass violence. Stanley 
Milgram (1974), for example, famously demonstrated that social norms 
of obedience to authority could compel average civilians to commit 
cruelties against their peers. Others who have argued for the role of 
elite orders and social pressures in motivating people to kill include 
Bauman (1989), Philip Gourevitch (1998), Raul Hilberg (1992), Herbert 
Kelman and V. Lee Hamilton (1989), Shaharyar Khan (2001), and Chris-
tian Scherrer (2002). Far from a mark of deviance or abnormality, geno-
cidal actions are explained in this theoretical perspective as outcomes 
of institutionalized norms and everyday forms of interaction.
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Likewise, in tandem with developments in social movement research, 
theories of genocide have shifted to focus on the relationship between 
genocide and modernity, especially processes of democratization. 
Michael Mann (2005), for example, writes that “mass ethnic  cleansing” 
is “the dark side of democracy.” He proposes eight theses, but the cen-
tral argument in his 2005 work is that when demos and ethnos become 
entwined—that is to say, when ethnic, as opposed to civic, concep-
tualizations of the nation predominate—the ideal of the nation-state 
encourages the cleansing of minorities. Likewise, Andreas Wimmer 
asserts that modernity rests on democracy, citizenship, and national 
self-determination, or what he calls “the indivisible trinity of the world 
order” (2002: 3). The achievement of this trinity is impossible without 
some kind of forced expulsion, assimilation, or extermination—that is 
to say, genocide. Others who argue that liberal concepts of democracy, 
including those around race, ethnicity, and nation, are necessary for the 
occurrence of genocide include Mark Levene (2005), Jacques Sémelin 
(2007), and Eric Weitz (2003).
From the mid-1980s to the late 1990s, the political process approach 
to social movements characterized by a focus on resource mobiliza-
tion, framing, and political opportunity structures came to dominate 
the literature in the field (Beck 2008). This approach stems largely from 
a shift in why social movements occur to how. Unfortunately, genocide 
research has yet to crystallize around a framework of theoretical per-
spectives in the same way. As Erik Schneiderhan (2013) notes, even 
recent turns from teleological theories of genocide to more pragmatic, 
process-focused approaches insufficiently specify the theoretical frame-
works guiding their analysis. The problem of how to think about and 
situate genocide is also evident in ongoing theoretical debates on what, 
exactly, constitutes genocide for purposes of social scientific analysis 
(Straus 2012; Verdeja 2012). The contentious politics framework, espe-
cially key concepts from research on social movements, can therefore 
provide useful tools for understanding human behavior in situations 
of extreme state violence. When it comes to theorizing participation in 
genocide, four mechanisms currently receive the majority of scholarly 
attention: obedience to authority (or instrumentalization), intergroup 
antagonism, within-group pressures, and dehumanization (for a review 
of these approaches, see Luft 2015b). Some researchers also note how 
it is possible, and in fact common, for multiple mechanisms and moti-
vations to function simultaneously during a genocide (Browning 1998; 
Finkel and Straus 2012; Hinton 2004; McBride 2016; Straus 2006) and 
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also for people to shift stances from participation to resistance or rescu-
ing behaviors and back again (Luft 2015b).
Perhaps, then, as a result of this diversity in mechanisms identified 
at the micro-level of participation, studies of what motivates civilians to 
kill in genocide lack a unifying theoretical framework. It is here where 
basic approaches and concepts from social movements can help. Spe-
cifically, theories of contention can offer guidelines for how to think 
about the processes that draw previously nonviolent civilians into vio-
lent actions against their neighbors. Thus, in what follows, I demon-
strate the potential for social movement studies to shed light on civilian 
mobilization for genocide using observational field notes, oral testimo-
nies with Rwandans who participated in the 1994 genocide, and Human 
Rights Watch organizational reports. The results specify how resources, 
framing, and political opportunity structures mattered for mobilizing 
previously nonviolent civilians to kill their neighbors. In the conclusion, 
I suggest that it is time for social movement studies and genocide stud-
ies to converge once again.
Data and Methods
The heart of this analysis is the full set of transcribed interviews con-
tained in Intimate Enemy: Images and Voices of the Rwandan Genocide 
by Robert Lyons and Scott Straus (2006). Though but a small sample of 
the total percentage of civilians who participated in the genocide,3 these 
Rwandans are representative of the kinds of local-level killers that mobi-
lized for violence against their neighbors in 1994: “farmers, fishermen, 
and carpenters from all around Rwanda who made the genocide pos-
sible” (Lyons and Straus 2006: 17). Still, this small sample size cannot 
be considered statistically representative. Consequently, I treat this data 
as a set of 21 cases that provide insights on civilian mobilization for 
genocide that ought to be extended with future work (Small 2009). The 
goal is to identify mechanisms for violent mobilization that are similar 
to those found in research on contentious politics and suggest opportu-
nities for future research based on these findings.
That said, to ascertain validity and reliability as best as possible given 
the difficult nature of the data (discussed further below), I triangu-
lated these transcripts with the entirety of reports from Human Rights 
Watch concerning violence in Rwanda from 1990 to 1999 (n=9) as 
well as my own field notes from research in Rwanda in the summer of 
2009. All interviews and organizational reports were coded using NVivo 
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qualitative analysis software and the abductive analysis method, thus 
allowing themes and patterns from past work on social movements to 
inform the coding while also attending to how the data diverged from 
this work and its findings (Tavory and Timmermans 2014).
Last but not least, concerning the challenges of working with par-
ticipants in political violence, it is worth stating outright that studying 
genocide is tricky business. Unfortunately, because of the dangerous 
context in which it occurs (genocide nearly always happens during 
war), it is relatively difficult to research civilian participation in geno-
cide. As a result, few studies have been able to use real-time participant 
observation or interviews as methods for understanding what motivates 
civilians to kill.4 That the data is retrospective therefore presents several 
dilemmas. Civilians who kill in genocide might downplay their partici-
pation in order to mitigate their responsibility or demonstrate contrition 
to interviewers or imaginary readers. They may also alter their stories 
for fear of reprisal by family, friends, or the state. Though the partici-
pants whose accounts I consider here had already admitted their guilt 
and been sentenced for their crimes at the time of the interview, it is 
also possible that their time in prison shaped their recollections of the 
genocide, as conversations with other participants might have altered 
their memories (Fujii 2010). Finally, since 1996, the Rwandan govern-
ment has instituted a Demobilization and Reintegration Program also 
known as Ingando that seeks to “reeducate” participants in the geno-
cide, and this program is highly controversial (Mgbako 2005; Thomson 
2009, 2011).5 It is likely that the respondents whose testimonies are 
considered here experienced this program and that this shaped their 
interpretations of the violence as well. To mitigate the consequences of 
these various and complex issues, I triangulate Lyons and Straus’s raw 
transcripts with Human Rights Watch organizational reports and my 
own fieldwork notes from Rwanda in 2009 to assess the validity and 
reliability of each claim. Below, I present the results of my analysis.
Theories of Contention and Mobilizing for Genocide
Resource Mobilization
Resource Mobilization Theory (hereafter, RMT) stems from the “public 
goods problem” most significantly interpreted by Mancur Olson (1965). 
As mentioned above, past social movement scholars argued that indi-
viduals mobilized for protest due to common interests and various 
kinds of dissatisfaction. However, Olson argued, if everyone had the 
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same interests, then it would simply be easier and safer to be a “free 
rider” than to be a protestor. In considering the “free rider problem,” 
RMT, drawing on Olson, argued by logic that all collective action was 
individually irrational. People would not become involved unless they 
were coerced or provided with direct rewards for joining. Recognizing 
that interests do not directly translate into action was an important 
corrective to past research, but the question then became “what does 
motivate such action?” Scholars working with RMT argue that mobili-
zation for social movements is directly tied to the presence of available 
resources and organizations that can help foster mobilization and, in 
fact, help make the decision to participate in collective action a rational 
one when benefits outweigh costs. Consequently, what predicts whether 
actors will mobilize is whether movement entrepreneurs can mobilize 
group resources via organizations to the extent that individual participa-
tion is rational (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977).
In the classic formulation of RMT, social-organizational resources 
are central to the mobilization process. As a result, most work stud-
ied how organizations helped generate the mobilization of money and 
labor, resources that would otherwise remain individual (Klandermans 
1997; Klandermans and Oegema 1987).6 However, in a recent formula-
tion, Bob Edwards and John McCarthy (2004) synthesized past work 
to create a fivefold typology of resource forms: moral, cultural, social-
organizational, human, and material. They emphasize that the various 
forms of resources are divided unequally among social groups. Thus, 
resources can come from within a group or from outside of it, and there 
are myriad kinds of resources, all of which vary historically (i.e., media 
and technology) and socially (groups with affluent members might have 
more access to material resources, whereas groups of the working class 
might have more access to human capital).
Like a social movement, genocide rarely occurs as the result of a 
spontaneous outburst. A majority of the population does not suddenly 
and unbidden take up arms against its neighbors. Instead, organizations 
help mobilize civilians and provide guidance, legitimacy, and benefits 
to participation. The case of Rwanda is illustrative: in the 1994 geno-
cide, violence rarely began with civilians killing on their own. Rather, 
Hutu were first directed to attack Tutsi in local meetings organized by 
extremist political authorities.7 Further, these meetings had a historical 
precedent: in Rwanda prior to the 1994 genocide, each cell had an orga-
nized committee in which five elected representatives managed under 
a leader. Cell committees were in charge of organizing communal work 
(umuganda) and, when necessary, mob attacks used to organize group 
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responses to danger (igitero) (Mironko 2004).8 During the 1994 geno-
cide, leaders in these meetings would tell Hutu to kill Tutsi, and leaders 
would occasionally commit acts of violence themselves. Through such 
actions, they verbally and visually indicated that systematic murder 
of Tutsi was how the conflict would proceed. Des Forges (1999: 6–8) 
explains:
The genocide was not a killing machine that rolled inexorably for-
ward. . . . Orders from the prime minister were handed down to the 
prefect, who passed them on to the burgomasters, who called local 
meetings throughout the communes where they read the instructions 
to the population. . . . By appropriating the well-established hierar-
chies of the military, administrative and political systems, leaders of 
the genocide were able to exterminate Tutsi with astonishing speed 
and thoroughness.
Likewise, Jerome, a farmer from Kibuye who killed four Tutsi during 
the genocide, describes the first meeting in his sector, where leaders 
separated the population and started killing:
Before the president’s death, we had no problems. . . . The killings 
reached our sector because of a businessman, in collaboration with 
the burgomaster. They were the ones who created divisions in the 
population. They held a meeting to separate people. They said that 
the country was being taken over by the Tutsis and that the Hutus 
were finished. They said that we had to defend ourselves. There were 
Tutsis who worked in the hospital and a Tutsi pastor. After this meet-
ing, the businessmen and the burgomaster told people to go and hunt 
these Tutsis.
Along with Des Forges’s description, Jerome’s testimony shows how 
genocide was instigated and supported by Rwandan authorities in orga-
nized meetings that facilitated transmission of the call to arms. These 
leaders not only encouraged violence but they also lowered the costs of 
participation by publicly endorsing a hardliner stance. They also raised 
the costs of nonparticipation by drawing on the social-historical and 
cultural significance of organized meetings to mobilize civilians for vio-
lence. In addition to providing a setting by which ordinary Rwandans 
learned what was expected of them in the new social context of war, 
organized meetings were a resource infused with historical legitimacy, 
one that was used by extremists to mobilize civilians for violence.
By contrast, where local Rwandan committees resisted violence 
and organizational state structures resisted co-optation by extremists, 
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violence did not occur (see, for example, the case of Giti in Bangwanu-
busa 2009 and Straus 2006). Without the legitimacy provided by state 
actors and institutions, as well as the coordination and communication 
mechanisms provided by the state as an organization, it is unlikely that 
genocide would have happened. Organized meetings were critical for 
accumulating diverse forms of resources and mobilizing civilians to 
participate in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.
Framing
The key idea on how framing matters for social movements is that 
meanings do not emerge automatically out of preexisting structural 
arrangements, unanticipated events, or long-held ideologies (Benford 
and Snow 2000). Rather, while resource mobilization theorists assumed 
that people held shared grievances and would act on them if the ben-
efits outweighed the costs, framing theorists argued that, actually, the 
process of getting people to collectively align with a particular diag-
nosis, prognosis, and call to action9 requires successful framing work 
by movement entrepreneurs (Benford and Snow 2000; Gamson 1975, 
1992; Snow et al. 1986). Ivan Ermakoff (2010: 545) explains further, 
“un expected events do not produce their own interpretations. They call 
for them.” Thus there are multiple ways of looking at the same situa-
tion, and the process of creating frames that people draw on to make 
sense of unfolding events is active, complex, interactional, and negoti-
ated. Frames are not aggregates of individual attitudes and perceptions, 
but the outcome of negotiating shared meanings (Gamson 1992).10 
Additionally, because developing, generating, and elaborating frames 
are contested processes, activists cannot simply impose any frame and 
expect it to succeed. Rather, there are a variety of challenges confront-
ing those who engage in movement framing, including counterframing 
efforts (Benford and Hunt 1994) and framing contests (Ryan 1991).
In the 1994 Rwandan genocide, framing processes were critical to the 
shaping of how civilians throughout the country made sense of initial 
violence in the capital, Kigali, and especially President  Habyarimana’s 
assassination,11 which was articulated by extremists organizing the geno-
cide as a motive for violence. Those first killed in Rwanda were oppo-
nents of the Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le 
Développement (MRND) political party to which extremists belonged, 
Hutu and Tutsi alike. The initial targets included politicians opposed to 
the presidential majority as well as those who encouraged ad herence to 
the Arusha Accords.12 Human rights activists and civil society leaders 
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were also among the first attacked on the basis of the assumption that 
they, like the others, would encourage and accept negotiations with the 
 Rwandan Patriotic Front—a rebel group of Tutsi refugees that threatened 
the state by launching a civil war from Uganda in 1990 (Reyntjens 1994). 
This targeting of moderates who might have mitigated extremists’ calls 
for violence through the promotion of a different frame is indicative of 
how genocide organizers, like social movement leaders, develop and 
deploy frames to achieve a specific purpose. They simultaneously seek to 
limit the promotion of oppositional frames that might impede their aims.
Furthermore, evidence indicates that extremists’ attempts to promote 
this frame of Tutsi responsibility for President Habyarimana’s assassi-
nation succeeded. Of 21 perpetrators interviewed by Straus, 81 percent 
noted the significance of Habyarimana’s death for the start of violence 
in their sectors. However, Habyarimana’s assassination did not lead 
to killings outright. In fact, testimony from perpetrators shows how it 
was extremists’ interpretations of the death and their communication 
of its significance to civilians that spurred violence. Important leaders 
at the local level in Rwanda articulated the crisis in racial frames—they 
blamed all Tutsi for the President’s death and described Tutsi as in-
herently threatening to Hutu—and this stimulated respondents to begin 
thinking about their circumstances in a racialized manner.13 
Consider Alphonse, responsible for killing one person during the 
genocide and leading one attack, who recalls: “At the beginning, every-
one was afraid. We didn’t know who was to be killed and who was 
not to be killed. We heard gunshots in the city, which made us afraid. 
Tutsis and Hutus hid together.” Prior to the genocide, Alphonse had a 
Tutsi wife and mother. Similarly, François explains how, four days after 
the death of the president, “[we] joined Tutsis and fought people from 
other regions that had attacked the area: we were together, sharing life 
and death.” François killed two Tutsi during the genocide and led one 
attack. He explains how “what changed was the death of Habyarimana. 
When the attacks came back, they said: ‘The Tutsis are bad. They killed 
the president.’ And that is when we killed them because they had killed 
the head of state.” In both these interviews, perpetrators describe initial 
peace and sometimes even coordinated Hutu and Tutsi attempts to ward 
off potential threats to their shared communities. What changed their 
alignment from with to against Tutsis was the use of a racial frame by 
those in power to articulate the crisis of the President’s assassination: 
the leaders depicted the murder as indicative of a Tutsi threat.
Importantly, arguing that framing mattered for shaping how Rwan-
dans understood the conflict around them is not the same as arguing 
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that civilians mobilized for genocide because they believed the frame. 
Rather, as I explain elsewhere (Luft 2015b), Hutu participated in the 
genocide for numerous and complex reasons, including in-group social 
pressures, direct coercion by authorities, a lack of access to financial 
resources that might otherwise have enabled them to resist, and chal-
lenging negotiations whereby people sometimes engaged in violence as 
a strategy to save others with whom they were close. Occasionally, these 
same people defected from participating in the genocide as well, sug-
gesting that the frame shaped people’s decision-making about violence, 
not that it caused them to align with extremists only. 
Simultaneously, the argument about framing also does not negate the 
fact that some civilians aligned with the racist frames of hardliners due 
to ideological collusion, in which people align with movements because 
their beliefs match those of the mobilizers (Ermakoff 2008). Nor does 
it negate participation as a result of ideological transformation, which 
occurs when individuals reconstruct their meaning systems, usually in 
the context of intense socialization and heightened emotionality (Oliver 
and Johnston 2000). Thinking about framing as separate from ideol-
ogy, particularly in the context of genocide, allows us to meaningfully 
theorize the different reasons why people mobilize for violence without 
assuming that the frame itself is equivalent to participants’ beliefs. As 
a result, the statements from participants in the Rwandan genocide 
introduce an important addendum to common understandings of why 
civilians kill: for many ordinary Rwandans, extremists’ framing shaped 
the lens through which they perceived the President’s assassination and 
the conflict unfolding around them. In turn, attention to framing allows 
researchers to meaningfully theorize mobilization for genocide with-
out treating extremists’ discourse as equivalent to civilians’  motivations 
for participating. 
This finding combines diverse micro-level theories of the Rwandan 
genocide with a general framework from social movement research 
into a common theoretical mechanism. Though it is often treated as a 
given that the categories of a genocide are very significant categories 
in civilians’ lives before the conflict, these perpetrators’ testimonies 
indicate that, for some, their racial identities had once been much less 
consequential.14 In other words, racial identification in and of itself 
was not causal for Rwanda’s genocide once President Habyarimana 
was assassinated, as many scholars have argued (i.e., Gourevitch 1998; 
Mamdani 2001; Melvern 2004; Prunier 1995; White 2009). Rather, it 
is what was done with racial categories in a highly violent context 
that mattered (Fujii 2009; Luft 2015b; Straus 2006). Considering the 
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literature on framing from social movements therefore allows schol-
ars to meaningfully theorize the possibility that relationships between 
Hutu and Tutsi were ruptured by the framing efforts of political entre-
preneurs—in this case genocidal extremists, bent on mobilizing Hutu 
civilians to kill their Tutsi neighbors—while simultaneously allow-
ing for the possibility that civilians’ motivations for aligning with the 
frame were diverse.
Political Opportunity Structures
In addition to mobilizing resources, as well as the importance of fram-
ing, the third concept in the now-classic tripartite social movement 
framework is the idea of political opportunity structures (hereafter, PS). 
Initially developed by Peter Eisinger (1973) and then expanded upon 
by Tilly (1978), the central point of PS is that exogenous factors can 
facilitate or constrain prospects for mobilization (Meyer and Minkoff 
2004). As a result, PS emphasize that framing processes are affected by 
the sociocultural and political contexts in which they are embedded, so 
framing and PS are interactively linked.
Furthermore, PS also shape activists’ decision-making processes 
about when to mobilize, not just how, and so here too interactions 
between resource mobilization and external politics matter. For example, 
scholars have argued that increased access to state structures (McAdam 
1982; Tarrow 1989), the nature of political cleavages (including divi-
sions within the elite) (Tarrow 1989), state capacity and strength (high 
or low) (Amenta et al. 1994; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995), alliance 
structures (Tarrow 1989), perceived threat (Einwohner 2003; Goldstone 
and Useem 1999; Goodwin 2001; Loveman 1998; Rasler 1996),15 and 
more inform the likelihood of a movement’s success and the repertoires 
of contention that a movement draws upon.
Predictably, given the wide array of work on PS and ideas about 
what constitutes an opportunity structure, as well as the lack of testing 
alongside negative cases—what Traci Sawyers and David Meyer (1999) 
call “missed opportunities” for social movement mobilization—some 
scholars have warned that the PS concept is “in danger of becoming a 
sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment” 
(Gamson and Meyer 1996: 275). Still, the central thesis that movements 
are shaped by their wider political environments is important not just 
for understandings of what facilitates social movement mobilization but 
also for understandings of what facilitates genocide. Extremists’ abilities 
to mobilize civilians for genocide heavily depend on events in the wider 
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political environment that provide openings for contentious actions that 
might not have existed beforehand. At the macro-level, research sug-
gests that war is necessary for genocide to take place. In fact, Straus 
writes: “The empirical connection between genocide and war is argu-
ably the most robust empirical finding in the most recent literature and 
genocides generally occur in wartime or in response to the threat of 
armed conflict” (2012: 546). Citing scholars such as Manus Midlarsky 
(2005), Jacques Sémelin (2007), Martin Shaw (2003), his own work 
(Straus 2006), and Benjamin Valentino and colleagues (2004), Straus 
details three causal mechanisms by which war leads to or facilitates 
genocide. First, war creates threat (perceived or real) and insecurity. 
This increases the probability that violence will be deployed to counter 
the threat. Second, war raises the likelihood that opponents will be 
classified as enemies targeted for destruction. Third, “war instigates the 
use of militarized forms of power (militaries, weaponry, and so forth)” 
(Straus 2012: 547). This, too, raises the probability of deploying lethal 
violence against perceived enemies. In short, “wars favor violence” 
(2012: 547). War can be seen as a political opportunity for extremists 
interested in mobilizing civilians for genocide. At both the macro- and 
micro-levels, this is evident in data from Rwanda.
President Habyarimana’s assassination was interpreted as a crisis for 
Rwandan civilians.16 Here again, it is worth recalling Ermakoff’s (2008, 
2010) argument that unexpected events are characterized by high levels 
of uncertainty. In such situations, individuals often desperately seek 
to reorient themselves. One mechanism for doing so is by looking to 
the behavioral stances adopted by prominent actors in a public setting 
(Ermakoff 2008).17 In Rwanda, MRND extremists became those promi-
nent actors through the opportunity created by the assassination. For 
hardliners who sought to take control of the state and oust both current 
and future political opposition, the sudden vacuum after Habyarimana’s 
death provided an opportunity to take control of state machinery and 
set in motion the wheels of genocide.18
At the micro-level, the political opportunity provided by Habyari-
mana’s assassination translated into individual behaviors in two ways. 
First, as discussed above, it allowed MRND extremists to make claims 
about the Tutsi threat given the context of the president’s death. Hard-
liners used official institutional channels to disseminate this idea of 
threat, especially through local organizations with a history of mobiliz-
ing civilians for social action. Second, the crisis of insecurity also made 
it more likely that civilians would believe hardliners’ framing, whereas 
they might not have listened to these explanations in times of peace and 
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normalcy. Consider, for example, Thierry’s account of why he partici-
pated in the genocide:
Before [the war], I had heard the history of the Tutsis, but I was never 
interested. With the 1990 war, I began to think about it, but not really. 
But with Habyarimana’s death, I became interested. . . . I learned that 
Habyarimana was shot at 8:00 am. That morning, everyone you saw 
said: ‘We have been saying . . . for a long time that the Tutsis will 
exterminate us and, voila, they just killed Habyarimana, who was 
protected. You, the simple peasants, you are finished.
Thierry killed one Tutsi during the genocide and led several attacks. He 
had a Tutsi wife and claims that, prior to the genocide, he did not know 
how to differentiate between Hutu and Tutsi. His testimony demon-
strates how the political opportunity provided by Habyarimana’s death 
opened the possibility for genocidal entrepreneurs to propagate a frame 
that Tutsi were evil and threatening and that they had to be eliminated. 
Furthermore, the acute crisis and uncertainty created by the event also 
increased the likelihood that some Rwandans would believe this par-
ticular frame, while others would align with it for the reasons discussed 
above. This interpretation follows research on PS that finds that frames 
that were not necessarily plausible in the past can become credible in 
times of uncertainty, partly because the crisis generated by disruption 
introduces the possibility of novelty (Ermakoff 2010). Likewise, in times 
of uncertainty, people can act in ways they might not have otherwise, 
especially when uncertainty is coterminous with the threat of violence. 
In sum, paying attention to the role of PS in genocides highlights 
the primacy of context in facilitating mobilization by extremists seek-
ing to enact genocidal violence and by followers reacting to unfolding 
dynamics. The social movement concept of PS furthers the possibility 
for scholarship on genocide to systematically theorize the contingent 
and processual nature of genocide, especially the role of external events 
in facilitating mobilization.
Discussion and Conclusion
This article argues that social movement research, especially in the field 
of contentious politics, holds relevant insights for studies of genocide 
and how civilians become mobilized to kill other civilians. Analysis 
of interviews with 21 civilian perpetrators in Rwanda combined with 
insights from secondary sources finds that resource mobilization and 
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organizations, framing processes, and political opportunity structures, 
are all critical to drawing civilians into genocidal participation. One sug-
gestion, then, is to incorporate research on genocide with research on 
contentious politics to advance theoretical knowledge of how and why 
civilians mobilize for genocide.
In Rwanda, MRND extremists put forth behavioral repertoires at local 
meetings with a history of state-endorsed mobilization for community 
labor and politics. They captured state institutions infused with a his-
torical and cultural precedent for coordination and mobilization and 
used them to articulate repertoires of violence to civilians deciding how 
to act in the context of uncertainty and war. Like social movements, 
genocides have costs and require resources, planning, communication, 
and the establishment of sanctioned behaviors. A core argument for 
what compels people to act in social movements focuses on the role of 
organizations in mobilizing individuals and diffusing behavioral reper-
toires. Mobilizing civilians for genocide proves no different: in Rwanda, 
by capturing the state and utilizing local organizations, institutions, and 
authorities, MRND extremists showed civilians how to “proceed.” Local 
meetings enforced political articulations and directed civilians’ actions. 
Importantly, in locations where these meetings did not take place, there 
was no genocide.
Additionally, after President Habyarimana’s assassination, Hutu 
Rwandan civilians did not erupt in spontaneous mass violence against 
their neighbors. Many did not even know who to blame for the presi-
dent’s death, and some organized locally with Tutsi peers against pos-
sible outside attackers. Movement activists—MRND extremists bent on 
eliminating the Tutsi population—had to actively shape local under-
standings of Habyarimana’s assassination. They adopted a racial frame 
that situated Tutsi and Hutu in direct opposition, blaming Tutsi for 
the assassination and calling on Hutu to publicly align against them 
to protect the country. Research on framing processes argues that the 
intentional activity of movement entrepreneurs to construct reality is 
an important aspect of social movement mobilization. The data herein 
demonstrate the role of conscious racial framing for reshaping social 
divisions in the Rwandan genocide. Finally, in Rwanda, the event of the 
assassination provided a political opportunity for extremists to capture 
state institutions and use them to disseminate the frame of the Tutsi 
threat and repertoires of violence against them. The crisis generated by 
the assassination also mattered because it made the hardliner frame of 
a Tutsi threat plausible. Scholarship on political opportunity structures 
argues that exogenous factors are often critical for the emergence of 
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social movements and for enhancing prospects of mobilization. Here, 
too, social movement research elucidates the process by which geno-
cides unfold.
To conclude, this article does not argue that genocide is a social 
movement per se. However, that genocidal behavior is exemplary of 
more general social processes stands in contrast to long-abandoned the-
ories of perpetrators as inherently evil, dysfunctional, or irrational, and 
it explains how ordinary civilians come to participate in extraordinary 
crimes—ideas both once at the heart of work on social movements. 
Empirically observable phenomena such as mobilizing resources and 
organizations, framing, and political opportunity structures, all nor-
mally associated with social movements and other forms of contentious 
politics, can be used to make sense of mobilizing processes in contexts 
in which civilians participate in mass state violence. Now, it is time to 
bring social scientific studies of genocide up to speed with social move-
ments and contentious politics research.
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Notes
 1. Exceptions include Rachel Einwohner (2003, 2006); Rachel Einwohner and 
Thomas Maher (2011); Maher (2010), and Michaela Soyer (2014). Each 
of these authors focuses on mobilization from below—in the case of the 
Holocaust, of Jews against Nazis—rather than the top-down mobilization 
process of genocide that is the focus of this article. As a result, perhaps the 
account that most closely resembles the study of genocide from a top-down 
social movements perspective is Yang Su’s (2011) study of collective killing 
in rural China during the cultural revolution. In analyzing the violence in 
Guangxi and Guangdong provinces, he draws on concepts such as iden-
tity formation, resource mobilization, political opportunity structures, and 
framing. However, Su specifies that although his case shares basic premises 
with genocide and mass killing, he considers it to be a phenomenon of a 
different kind. As a result, I likewise classify his study as being about vio-
lent collective action but not about genocide.
 2. A fuller, more comprehensive review of the history of research on genocide 
can be found in Luft (2015a).
 3. Straus (2004) estimates that between approximately 175,000 and 210,000 
Hutu Rwandans participated in the Rwandan genocide, amounting to 
between 7 percent and 8 percent of the active adult Hutu population in 
1994. This estimate does not distinguish between civilian and military or 
militia participants, but we can assume based on these statistics that the 
total number of civilian participants in the genocide was lower than this 
number, which includes every category of participant in the violence.
 4. The rare and remarkable exception is Alison des Forges’s Leave None To Tell 
the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (1999), published by Human Rights Watch. 
Des Forges was in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide, and her observations 
have proved indispensable for scholars ever since.
 5. A full review of the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program 
is beyond the scope of this article; however, scholars such as Mgbako 
(2005) and Thomson (2009, 2011) have written excellent analyses. I am 
also unable to include my own interviews with Rwandans from fieldwork 
in 2009 because of this program: during my time in Rwanda, my ability 
to interview Rwandans who participated in the genocide was highly con-
trolled and monitored by the government, and those I was able to speak 
with had recently returned (sometimes forcibly) from Democratic Republic 
of Congo only months or sometimes weeks earlier. These respondents’ 
unique situations precluded formal study participation under institutional 
review board standards; consequently, their accounts simply helped inform 
my reading of secondary data.
 6. The argument that organizations are critical for facilitating participation 
has been heavily criticized by Piven and Cloward (1977), who argue that 
poor people’s movements derive their gains from mass defiance, so build-
ing permanent organizations is inherently counterproductive to their aims. 
Likewise, Piven and Cloward (1992) claim that RMT blurs the distinction 
between normative and non-normative forms of collective action.
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 7. The nouns “Hutu” and “Tutsi” are typically used in the same form in the 
singular and the plural. I therefore maintain this practice throughout this 
paper unless directly quoting a source that does otherwise.
 8. Des Forges suggests also that the Rwandan government had often mobi-
lized the population for past campaigns such as those to end illiteracy, to 
vaccinate children, and to improve the status of women. She writes that 
the Rwandan government “had executed these efforts through the existing 
administrative and political hierarchies, requiring agents to go beyond their 
usual duties for a limited period of time for some major goal of national 
importance. The organizers of genocide similarly exploited the structures 
that already existed . . . and called upon personnel to execute a campaign 
to kill Tutsi and Hutu presumed to oppose Hutu power” (1999: 317).
 9. What is otherwise known as diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and 
motivational framing (Snow and Benford 1988).
 10. The idea of framing is derived from Erving Goffman’s Frame Analysis 
(1974)—to frame something is to assign meaning to situations and events.
 11. Hutu Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana was president of Rwanda 
from 1973 to 1994. He was killed on 6 April 1994, when his airplane was 
shot down near Kigali Airport.
 12. The Arusha Accords consisted of a power-sharing deal brokered by the 
United Nations in August 1993 to end the civil war between the Govern-
ment of Rwanda and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).
 13. Note: I intentionally use the term “race” when describing Hutu/Tutsi cat-
egories during the 1994 genocide because in Rwanda, during the geno-
cide, “Hutu” and “Tutsi” were defined as racial categories according to the 
Rwandan government. For more on Rwanda’s ethnoracial categories, past 
and present, see Luft and Thomson (forthcoming).
 14. For a much more detailed analysis of the significance of race for genocide 
in Rwanda and the relationship between racial categories and behavioral 
categories of perpetrator, victim, bystander, and rescuer in the 1994 geno-
cide, see Luft (2015b).
 15. Though the concept of “opportunity” in PS can seem to imply the opening 
of state structures and other exogenous factors that facilitate mobilization, 
a significant body of work argues that, in fact, increasing repression and 
the closing of political access can be thought of as a political opportunity 
as well. These scholars find that perceptions of threat triggered by repres-
sion frequently lead contenders to mobilize defensively (Almeida 2003, 
2008; Einwohner and Maher 2011; Gamson and Meyer 1996; Maher 2010; 
McVeigh 1999, 2009; O’Hearn 2009; Soyer 2014; Tilly 1978; Van Dyke and 
Soule 2002). By contrast, some scholars argue that threat and opportunity 
are distinct concepts. In particular, Jack Goldstone and Charles Tilly (2001) 
deconstruct threat into two kinds: harms currently experienced and antici-
pated, or current threat, and repressive threat, which is characterized by 
perceived costs of inaction. They argue that mobilization is more likely to 
occur when threats are perceived as current and lethal.
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 16. Schneiderhan (2013) makes a similar argument about President Habyari-
mana’s assassination, but his analysis of how this moment of acute in-
security led to genocide differs from the one presented here.
 17. According to Ermakoff (2008), there are three ways in which members 
of a group facing the same decision align their behaviors with one an-
other: alignment can be sequential, through the observation of stances 
that others within one’s reference group are taking; local, through private 
conversations with similar others; or tacit, through inference-making pro-
cesses drawn by observing the stances taken by prominent actors. Each 
of these was present during the Rwandan genocide, as civilians sought 
to make sense of events unfolding around them, but time and again tacit 
co ordination emerges as the most significant process for eventual perpetra-
tors’ understandings of the conflict as one between Hutu and Tutsi, with 
Tutsi being responsible for the assassination of Habyarimana.
 18. To this day, responsibility for President Habyarimana’s assassination 
remains unclear. According to latest data, responsibility lies with the 
RPF and current Rwandan President Paul Kagame (for a summary, see 
www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-new-information-supports-
claims-kagame-forces-were-involved-in/). According to President Kagame, 
however, the president’s plane was shot down by Hutu extremists who 
were a part of his inner circle and who intended to eliminate and intimi-
date moderates in the government, including the president himself 
(Lemarchand 2018).
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